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IV.

V.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution clearly prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures.1 In light of what can be found
in a person’s blood with today’s technology, defining what
constitutes an unreasonable search or unreasonable seizure in
biological sample extraction has become a challenge. Particularly,
medical and personal information is becoming increasingly
discoverable. Such discoverability has caused federal and state courts
to pause and consider what this means for an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights.

1.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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This Note first describes the history of United States law and
Minnesota law on blood draw testing.2 This Note goes on to describe
Minnesota’s current search and seizure limitations—namely the
Particularity Clause and guidelines for warrant interpretation.3 Next,
this Note explains the facts and procedural history, the majority
discussion and decision, and the dissenting opinions of the
Minnesota Supreme Court case State v. Fawcett.4 This Note then
analyzes the majority’s two main assertions:
(1) the testing of a blood draw is a search; and
(2) a warrant for a blood draw must particularly describe how
the blood will be tested.
This Note argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
characterization of a blood draw as a search is proper.5 This Note
also argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court erred because the
warrant at issue did not particularly describe the search of Fawcett’s
blood for alcohol and drugs.6 This Note concludes by describing how
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Fawcett (1) sheds light
on how cases around the United States may be decided after the
recent United States Supreme Court Birchfield decision, and (2) sets
new precedent in Minnesota.7
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A.

Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law in Relation to Blood
Draws and Analysis
1.

Minnesota Adopted the United States Supreme Court’s Definitions
of “Seizure” and “Search”

The Minnesota Supreme Court has agreed with the United
States Supreme Court that a seizure has occurred “if in view of all of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he or she was neither free to disregard the
police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.”8 The
2. See infra Section II.A.
3. See infra Section II.B.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Section IV.A.
6. See infra Section IV.B.
7. See infra Part V.
8. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995) (internal citations
omitted).
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Minnesota Supreme Court has also agreed with the United States
Supreme Court that “[a] search occurs when an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”9
2.

In 1966, the United States Supreme Court Classified a Blood
Draw as a Seizure and Blood Draw Testing as a Search in
Schmerber

In the 1966 case Schmerber v. California,10 the United States
Supreme Court classified the administration of a blood test as both
the seizure of a person and the subsequent search of that person.11
The Court reasoned that since a blood draw requires piercing the
skin, a blood draw is extremely personal.12 The Court analogized that
just as search warrants are required for intrusions into the extremely

9. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984)); see also State v.
Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 860 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967)) (explaining that constitutional protections in Minnesota are not
considered until a person has “expectations of privacy that ‘society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable’”).
10. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
11. Id. at 767 (“It could not reasonably be argued . . . that the administration
of the blood test in this case was free of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.
Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of ‘persons,’ and depend
antecedently upon seizures of ‘persons,’ within the meaning of that Amendment.”).
The Court in Schmerber does not clearly define what it means by “blood test.” The
phrase “administration of a blood test” indicates the Court may have been referring
only to the blood draw when using the term “blood test.” This interpretation is
supported by the case’s issue statement: “The question is squarely presented
therefore, whether the chemical analysis introduced in evidence in this case should
have been excluded as the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure.” Id.
at 766–67. The way in which the Court identifies in this statement that the “chemical
analysis” is the product of a “search and seizure” indicates three events: (1) “seizure”
of the person, (2) “search” in the form of a blood draw, and (3) chemical analysis
of the blood. Schmerber concluded that there was only one seizure and only one
search because the issue of three potential Fourth Amendment events was not
before it; the defense did not attempt to distinguish between the blood draw and
the chemical analysis of the blood and to name the latter as a “search.” Andrei
Nedelcu, Blood and Privacy: Towards a “Testing-as-Search” Paradigm Under the Fourth
Amendment, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 195, 198–99 (2015).
12. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769–70 (“Whatever the validity of these
considerations in general, they have little applicability with respect to searches
involving intrusions beyond the body’s surface. The interests in human dignity and
privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.”).
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personal place of a person’s dwelling, search warrants should also be
required for intrusions into the extremely personal place of a
person’s body.13
Nevertheless, the Schmerber Court also recognized an exception
to the warrant requirement in emergency situations.14 The Court
held that results of the blood test in Schmerber were admissible under
this exception to the warrant requirement because the situation
constituted an emergency.15 In Schmerber, the petitioner refused to
submit to a breathalyzer test, and evidence of alcohol usage was
quickly dissipating into the petitioner’s blood stream.16 If the police
had not taken the petitioner’s blood at that moment, the Court
reasoned, the evidence could have been permanently lost.17
3.

In 1988, the Ninth Circuit Interpreted Schmerber’s Search and
Seizure Classifications as One Fourth Amendment Event in
Snyder

Later courts have remarked that when the United States
Supreme Court in Schmerber classified a blood draw as seizure and the
blood draw’s testing as a search, the Court meant that both the
seizure and the search happened within one distinct Fourth
Amendment event.18 In United States v. Snyder, a 1988 Ninth Circuit
case,19 the defendant was suspected of driving under the influence
of intoxicants (“DUI”).20 The defendant tried to use the Schmerber
opinion to convince the court that a warrantless, emergency seizure
of a person’s blood in the form of a blood draw and the subsequent
search of that blood in the form of chemical analysis were distinct
Fourth Amendment events.21 The defendant explained that after a
person’s blood is drawn, the sample retains whatever alcohol content
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 771.
16. Id. at 770–71. Similar to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in
Schmerber that a warrant is not required for a blood draw due to the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, a majority of states, including
Minnesota, have also ruled that an arrest is not necessary prior to the taking of a
blood draw. FLEM K. WHITED III, DRINKING/DRIVING LITIGATION: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
§ 7:4 (2d ed. 2016).
17. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71.
18. See infra note 28.
19. 852 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1988).
20. Id. at 472.
21. Id. at 473.
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was in it at the time of the draw.22 The defendant concluded that
since his seized blood retained the alcohol level it had at the time of
the accident, the emergency exception to the warrant requirement
discussed in Schmerber did not apply to his case.23 Thus, a warrant was
needed to have chemically analyzed the defendant’s blood.24
The Ninth Circuit decided that the defendant’s line of
reasoning was “too much” because it broke up the DUI incident into
too many independent Fourth Amendment events.25 The court
asserted that Schmerber had established that the events of the arrest,
the blood draw, and the blood’s testing were indivisible in the eyes

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (“[Defendant] points out, however, that the exigency justifying
extraction of blood is eliminated once the blood is removed from the suspect’s
body, because any traces of alcohol in the extracted blood will be preserved
indefinitely.”).
25. Id. The Snyder court summarized the defendant’s argument as such: “He
would have us hold that his person was seized when he was arrested, his blood was
seized again upon extraction at the hospital, and finally his blood was searched two
days later when the blood test was conducted.” Id. Note that in so characterizing the
defendant’s argument, the Ninth Circuit identifies one more potential Fourth
Amendment event that the Schmerber Court did not identify: the seizure of blood,
which is distinct from the seizure of the person. Snyder’s seizure-seizure-search
formulation, where the blood draw is the second seizure, is distinct from the
Supreme Court’s seizure-search-[possible second search] formulation in Schmerber,
where the blood draw is the first search. See supra note 11. In characterizing the
blood draw as a “seizure” instead of a “search,” the Ninth Circuit in Snyder
inadvertently introduced the idea of four possible distinct Fourth Amendment
events in the process of a DUI conviction when combined with Schmerber’s two (and
possibly three) Fourth Amendment events. See id. These four possible Fourth
Amendments are: (1) seizure of the person, (2) search of the person through the
blood draw, (3) seizure of the blood through the blood draw, and, possibly, (4)
analysis of the blood. The Supreme Court in Schmerber only addressed events (1) and
(2), ignoring (4) because the defendant failed to distinguish (4) from (2). Nedelcu,
supra note 11, at 198. The Ninth Circuit in Snyder only addressed events (1), (3),
and (4), although they spent little time on (3), seizure of the blood through the
blood draw. Part of Snyder’s error, then, is in misunderstanding the Supreme Court’s
use of the term “blood test” in Schmerber to infer that the Court had already
concluded that (4) analysis of the blood is a search. In reality, however, the Supreme
Court’s use of the term “blood test” in Schmerber was to establish that (2) the blood
draw was a search (a search that possibly encompassed (4) analysis of the blood).
Although there is uncertainty about how much the Supreme Court meant to
connect (2) the blood draw and (4) analysis of the blood with its use of the term
“blood test,” it had not concluded at that time whether (4) analysis of the blood is
a search that stands apart from (2) the blood draw. See id.
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of the Fourth Amendment.26 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
concluded, Schmerber must be interpreted in a way that classifies the
seizure of a person, the seizure of his blood, and the subsequent
search of that blood as one distinct Fourth Amendment event.27
26. Snyder, 852 F.2d at 474. The proof the Ninth Circuit offered in support of
its interpretation that the Schmerber Court meant for the DUI incident to be one
indivisible Fourth Amendment event is this quote from Schmerber: “The questions we
must decide in this case are whether the police were justified in requiring petitioner
to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in
taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of
reasonableness.” Id. at 474 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768
(1966)). The Snyder court did not specifically explain how this quote supports its
conclusion that the Supreme Court in Schmerber saw the blood draw and the blood
test as two events that are indivisible in the eyes of the Fourth Amendment.
However, the Snyder court reasoned that since the only justification for the blood
draw in Schmerber was to seize evidence of alcohol content, the right to search the
blood was assumed when the right to seize the blood was attained. Id.
27. Id. at 473–74. (“It seems clear, however, that Schmerber viewed the seizure
and separate search of the blood as a single event for fourth amendment
purposes.”). The interpretation in Snyder and later courts believe the Schmerber
Court’s adoption of joining the seizure and search of the process of a blood draw
into one inseparable Fourth Amendment event has been challenged by the
emergence of new DNA collection methods. See Justin A. Alfano, Look What Katz
Leaves Out: Why DNA Collection Challenges the Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017, 1030 (2005). Many modern DNA extraction techniques
require significantly less intrusion into the human body than a blood draw requires.
Id. at 1030–31. The Supreme Court has ruled that the testing of DNA obtained by
such a minimal intrusion as a buccal swab is still a search. Maryland v. King, 133 S.
Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2013). Unless the Supreme Court finds that there exists a less
intrusive DNA sampling technique than the taking of a buccal swab, it can be
inferred that all bodily intrusions used to take DNA samples are considered searches
regardless of the level of seizure preceding the search. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.6(a) (5th ed. 2016). Furthermore, DNA testing techniques are
already so advanced that DNA can be taken from “abandoned samples”—everyday
items like disposable cups on which suspects have left saliva or other DNA-carrying
fluids. Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues,
76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 436 (2001). If testing an abandoned and unseized biological
sample was still to be considered a “search,” this would, by definition, require that
there was some sort of intrusion other than intrusion into a person’s body. One such
intrusion that would make the testing of an unseized biological sample a search
would be the test’s intrusion into an expectation of privacy regarding “private
medical facts” that can be found in DNA. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA
Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 481–82 (2001) (quoting
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)). When such testing
intrudes on an expectation of privacy regarding “private medical facts,” the testing
is a search that does not need to be connected to an antecedent seizure and
intrusion into a person’s body. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification
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However, the Ninth Circuit in Snyder did not go so far as to say that
the testing of the blood sample was not a search.28
4.

State Courts Went Beyond Snyder and Said Blood Tests Are Not
Searches

Many state courts not only adopted the Ninth Circuit’s Snyder
interpretation of Schmerber—that exigent-circumstance DUI blood
draws and analysis constitute one Fourth Amendment event—but
also went beyond the Snyder decision by saying that this Fourth
Amendment event terminates when the blood is drawn and that the
individual loses all expectation of privacy in a blood sample once his
or her blood is seized.29 The state courts’ holdings that there is no
Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L.
REV. 413, 444 (2003) (“[T]he sensitive nature of some of the information locked in
the helices of the DNA molecule leads us to believe that DNA sampling is a Fourth
Amendment search, even if the sample is obtained noninvasively.”).
28. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “under Schmerber, so long as blood is
extracted incident to a valid arrest based on probable cause to believe that the
suspect was driving under the influence of alcohol, the subsequent performance of
a blood-alcohol test has no independent significance for fourth amendment
purposes.” Snyder, 852 F.2d at 474. A footnote clarifies this statement as follows:
“This assumes, of course, that ‘the test chosen to measure [the defendant’s] bloodalcohol level was a reasonable one’ and ‘was performed in a reasonable manner’
under Schmerber.” Id. at 474 n.2 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771). This footnote’s
discussion of “reasonableness” in regard to the blood’s testing indicates the Ninth
Circuit still considered blood testing to be a search, just not a search that is an
independent Fourth Amendment event in relation to the blood draw.
29. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001) (holding that the
defendant had an expectation of privacy in his blood sample until his blood was
drawn, as the Fourth Amendment event terminated after the draw and no new
seizures or searches subsequently occurred); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1272
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (“Any legitimate expectation of privacy that the appellant
had in his blood disappeared when that blood was validly seized.”); People v. King,
663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (1997) (“Privacy concerns are no longer relevant once the
sample has already lawfully been removed from the body, and the scientific analysis
of a sample does not involve any further search and seizure of a defendant’s
person.”); State v. Barkley, 551 S.E.2d 131, 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“Once the
blood was lawfully drawn from defendant’s body, he no longer had a possessory
interest in that blood.”); State v. Sanders, Nos. 93-2284-CR, 93-2286-CR, 1994 WL
481723, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1994) (“We agree with the trial court that, once
the police came into lawful possession of the blood samples, Sanders lost any
expectation of privacy he may have had in them, at least insofar as testing for
intoxicants—whether alcohol or drug—related-is concerned.”); see also State v.
Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 144 (Haw. 2003) (“[A] number of jurisdictions have held on
analogous facts that once a blood sample and a DNA profile is lawfully procured
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expectation of privacy in a blood sample implies that testing a blood
sample is not a search; the definition of “search” requires the
infringement of an expectation of privacy.30
Many states agree that the analysis of blood is not a search in
exigent-circumstances DUI cases, and this is in contrast to the
general rule that the “collection and analysis of biological samples”
is a search.31 The reason for this anomaly may be largely policybased—if courts freely admit that an exigent-circumstances DUI
blood draw and analysis is a search, and if the blood’s analysis can be
identified as a search that is separate from the search of the blood
draw, it follows that a warrant would be required for that analysis.
This is the very argument the appellant in Schmerber made to no

from a defendant, no privacy interest persists in either the sample or the profile.”);
State v. VanLaarhoven, 637 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (“Snyder teach[es]
that the examination of evidence . . . is an essential part of the seizure and does not
require a judicially authorized warrant. [Snyder] refuse[s] to permit a defendant to
parse the lawful seizure of a blood sample into multiple components.”); Nedelcu,
supra note 11, at 201 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.10(e) (5th ed. 2013)) (“[N]ational search and seizure
jurisprudence is largely in agreement: No express judicial authorization is needed
to analyze a suspect’s blood . . . once it has already been lawfully procured.”).
30. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“A ‘search’ occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed.”).
31. See State v. Surge, 94 P.3d 345, 347 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (observing that
“[c]ourts generally agree that the collection and analysis of biological samples from
an individual constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment”), aff’d,
156 P.3d 208 (Wash. 2007). Many state courts have found blood sample analysis not
to be a search in DUI cases mainly due to the fact that before Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), blood draws were often taken when probable cause
and the exigent circumstances justification for a warrantless search existed. The
justification of exigent circumstances was used because the evidence of substances
in the bloodstream dissipates if the blood draw is not conducted quickly. Evidence
obtained with probable cause and in exigent circumstances, taken and tested for
existence of evidence of a crime, is admissible. See, e.g., State v. Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d
79, 81 (Minn. 1980). Thus, it seems that pre-Birchfield courts were more willing to
acknowledge that non-blood draw biological-sample extraction techniques were
searches because the collection and analysis of such samples was not time-sensitive.
Pre-Birchfield courts were less willing to acknowledge that blood draws were searches
because the collection and analysis of such samples is time-sensitive, and excessive
warrant requirements in a society that was not as technologically advanced as it is
today could easily result in evidence being lost in that short amount of time. See
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192–93 (describing recent technological advances that make
requesting and issuing warrants more expeditious).
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avail.32 Such a requirement would certainly burden police and
judges with what states may see as a frivolous need to justify testing
of samples that are already in the authorities’ hands.
Minnesota does not classify the testing of a lawfully obtained
blood sample as a search. In the 2010 Minnesota Court of Appeals
case Harrison v. Commissioner of Public Safety,33 the defendant
paralleled the argument made by the defendant in Snyder over two
decades earlier.34 The defendant in Harrison consented to blood
testing in two separate instances of DUI arrests.35 He argued that the
drawing of his blood and the subsequent testing of his blood sample
were two distinct Fourth Amendment events.36
The Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted Schmerber as
establishing that the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement applied to the blood’s analysis for alcohol content, not
just to the blood draw.37 Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Snyder, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Harrison rejected the
defendant’s reasoning that the drawing of blood and the testing of
blood are two independent Fourth Amendment events.38
Moreover, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Harrison adopted
the reasoning of a later Ninth Circuit decision, United States v.

32. Snyder, 852 F.2d at 473.
33. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010).
34. See Snyder, 852 F.2d at 472–73.
35. Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 919.
36. Id. at 921.
37. Id. at 920 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966))
(“[T]he United States Supreme Court . . . [has] recognized the validity of the
application of the exigent-circumstances exception to alcohol testing for impaired
driving.”). The Minnesota Court of Appeals identified that the Minnesota Supreme
Court came to the same conclusion in State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 549–50
(Minn. 2008). Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 920. However, the reasoning of both
Schmerber and Shriner that Harrison highlights justifies the drawing of a blood sample,
not the searching of such a sample. In citing Schmerber, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals points to this language: “[T]he delay necessary to obtain a warrant . . .
threaten[s] the destruction of evidence.” Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). In
citing Shriner, the Minnesota Court of Appeals points to this language: “[The] rapid,
natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates single-factor exigent
circumstances that will justify the police taking a warrantless, nonconsensual blood
draw from a defendant, provided that the police have probable cause to believe that
defendant committed criminal vehicular homicide or operation.” Id. (quoting
Shriner, 751 N.W.2d at 549–50).
38. Id. at 921.
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Kincade.39 In Kincade, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning went beyond
Snyder’s interpretation of Schmerber and resembled the positions of
other state courts. Harrison, relying on Kincade, specified that the
defendant lost all “legitimate” expectations of privacy in his blood
sample40 once the blood was drawn and that, accordingly, the testing
of the defendant’s blood was not a search at all.41 The Minnesota
Court of Appeals’ decision in Harrison never addressed the question
of whether the blood draw and the blood’s subsequent testing was
part of one or two Fourth Amendment events; it simply found that
the blood testing had no Fourth Amendment significance
whatsoever.42
39. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
40. Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 921 (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 837) (“We
conclude that when the state has lawfully obtained a sample of a person’s blood
under the implied-consent law, specifically for the purpose of determining alcohol
concentration, the person has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the
alcohol concentration derived from analysis of the sample.”). Harrison’s reliance on
Kincade is misplaced for two reasons. First, Kincade was not a case in which the
defendant’s blood draw was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances;
Kincade involved the blood draw of conditionally released federal offenders under
a “special need” analysis. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832. Therefore, the Kincade court
was not faced with the task of evaluating the role of policy considerations related to
exigent circumstances. Second, in Kincade the Ninth Circuit specifically stressed,
“Let us be clear: Our holding in no way intimates that conditional releasees’
diminished expectations of privacy serve to extinguish their ability to invoke the
protections of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” Id. at 835. This direct statement makes clear that a releasee has
“diminished” (as opposed to nonexistent) expectations of privacy. See id. The
releasee is still able to invoke Fourth Amendment protections despite the fact that
the releasee is convicted. On the other hand, the defendant in Harrison was on trial
for his drunk driving charge but had not been convicted. Thus, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals’ reliance on Kincade in Harrison was misplaced. The court lacked
foundation for its assertion that someone who is not convicted and whose blood was
lawfully obtained under implied-consent law, for the purpose of determining
alcohol concentration, has no “legitimate” expectation of privacy in the results of
the alcohol analysis.
41. Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 921 (“A search occurs when an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed . . . . Harrison
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration derived from
analysis of his lawfully-obtained blood sample.”). The court, generalizing this
principle, announced, “Absent such a privacy interest, any testing of the blood
sample for its alcohol concentration is not a search that implicates constitutional
protection.” Id.
42. By not addressing all the potential Fourth Amendment events that had
occurred in the facts of the case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ ruling in Harrison
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5.

The United States Supreme Court Continues to Protect Privacy
Expectations in Blood Samples

Despite a massive number of state cases holding that individuals
lose all expectations of privacy once their blood is drawn and that
the Fourth Amendment event terminates at that moment, the
United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that at
least part of an individual’s expectation of privacy extends beyond
the blood draw. First, in the 1989 case Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n,43 decided shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s Snyder
decision, the Supreme Court held that analysis of a biological sample
is a “further invasion”44 of the privacy interests of one who has
already been subjected to the government’s compelled intrusion
into his or her body.45 The Court explained the extent of the

differed from the assertion of many state courts. Using Schmerber, those courts held
that the blood draw and blood testing are part of one Fourth Amendment event. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
43. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
44. Id. at 616. The Court’s use of the phrase “further invasion” in Skinner is the
extent to which the Supreme Court had until that time, and even for years after,
attempted to describe the relationship between the taking of a biological sample
and the biological sample’s analysis. Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a
Property Paradigm to Mandate the Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 192
(2004). The Court never elaborated on what it really meant by “further invasion.”
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616–17. This lack of specificity makes tracking the number
of Fourth Amendment events in a DUI case during the Schmerber and Skinnner era
difficult and a matter of some conjecture.
45. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616–17 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25
(1987)). In Hicks, police raided a suspect’s apartment without a warrant in order to
find weapons, victims, and the possible shooter related to a bullet discharged from
the apartment. Id. at 321. When the police saw a stereo that they believed may have
been stolen, they moved some items around the stereo in order to access the stereo’s
serial number. Id. The Court held that the moving of these items did not constitute
a seizure because it did not “meaningfully interfere” with the respondent’s
possessory interests. Id. However, the Court held that the moving of the items was a
separate search because it was an invasion of the respondent’s privacy that was
“unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.” Id. at 325. Since
the police did not have a warrant for such a search, the Court affirmed the exclusion
of incriminating evidence found in the course of this unconstitutional search. Id. at
329. Given that the Court suppressed evidence in Hicks, the Skinner Court’s reliance
on Hicks to demonstrate what a “further invasion” looks like seems odd because the
Court did not suppress evidence in Skinner. Had the Skinner Court completed its
analogy to Hicks, it would have found that the “further invasion” of a blood sample’s
analysis caused the results to be inadmissible, just as the “further invasion” in Hicks
of police moving items in order to access a stereo’s serial number caused evidence
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invasion by noting that chemical testing of blood undisputedly “can
reveal a host of private medical facts.”46 The Court ultimately found
that the “further invasion” of chemical analysis of a biological sample
is not an unreasonable search.47 Nevertheless, it is significant that
the Court considered the “further invasion” of chemical analysis to
be a “search” that is subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny and
distinct from the search implicated in the taking of the biological
sample.48
Much more recently, in the 2013 case Maryland v. King,49 the
United States Supreme Court decided that the extraction and
analysis of DNA from an individual arrested on probable cause of a
serious offense is a search that is part of the singular process of

to be inadmissible.
46. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. In noting the medical invasiveness of blood testing,
Skinner picked up where Schmerber had left off. Skinner begins an ongoing judicial
discussion that separates the analysis of blood with its distinct privacy concerns (for
instance, medical information being exposed) from the privacy concerns inherent
in the blood draw (for instance, physical intrusion into the body).
47. Id. at 634. Notably, Skinner was not a DUI case, so the Court’s conclusions
in Skinner may not have been as binding on DUI case law as Schmerber was. In Skinner,
the government was testing urine samples of railway workers in order to make sure
that no railway employees were intoxicated. Id. at 620–21. Therefore, although the
Court in Skinner detoured briefly into a discussion of blood draw testing, the way in
which the context of Skinner differs from the general context of DUI case law is one
reason the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in a 1994 decision with facts nearly identical
to the facts in State v. Fawcett, see infra Section III.A, decided that Skinner was not
controlling. State v. Sanders, Nos. 93-2284-CR, 93-2286-CR, 1994 WL 481723, at *5
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (unpublished table decision).
48. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616, 633–34; see also Natalie Logan, Questions of Time,
Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights and Continued Seizure Under the DNA Act, 92
B.U. L. REV. 733, 740 (2012) (“Once collected, the analysis of the sample constitutes
a second, independent search of the seized sample.”). It has been argued that the
Court’s use of the term “further invasion” in Skinner was not intended to make a
clear distinction between the Fourth Amendment significance of a blood draw and
a blood sample’s analysis since Skinner’s factual context did not involve blood draws
and was based on the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement instead
of the “exigent circumstances” exception that is the basis of DUI blood draws and
testing. Nedelcu, supra note 11, at 195. However, the fact that the Skinner Court
intentionally detoured into a discussion of blood draws and relied on Hicks—a case
that clearly exemplifies what a “further invasion” looks like in a non-biological
sample case, see supra note 45—indicate that the Court’s use of the term “further
invasion” was in fact intended to allow future courts to assign independent Fourth
Amendment significance to blood sample analysis.
49. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
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arrest.50 The testing of blood samples obtained through warrantless
blood draws in suspected drunk driving cases is not considered
“administrative” as the DNA sample in King was.51 However, King is
still important to suspected drunk driving blood draw cases because
the Supreme Court interpreted the search in King to include both
the taking and the analyzing of a suspect’s biological information.52
The decision in King that the drawing and the analysis of blood is a
“search” differs from the many post-Snyder state cases. Since many
post-Snyder state court cases held that testing of biological material is
not a search and does not require analysis of whether the intrusion
offended an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy,53 the
Supreme Court’s holding in King clearly takes courts in a direction
that favors individuals’ rights to the privacy of their own blood.
In its 2016 case Birchfield v. North Dakota,54 the United States
Supreme Court bolstered its King interpretation of what a search is.
Reflecting on its King decision, the Court identified that the
authorities’ possession of King’s DNA was a greater intrusion into
the suspect’s expectation of privacy than the level of intrusion
50. Id. at 1965 (“[T]he Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is
a reasonable search . . . .”); id. at 1980 (“When officers make an arrest supported by
probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station
to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA
. . . is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added)).
51. Id. at 1970.
52. Id. at 1980 (“[O]nce respondent’s DNA was lawfully collected the STR
analysis of respondent’s DNA . . . did not amount to a significant invasion of privacy
that would render the DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment.” (emphases added)). In its language, the Court differentiated
between the DNA’s collection, which it deemed lawful, and the DNA’s analysis,
which it reviewed in terms of whether the analysis was an “invasion of privacy.”
Though the Court found the analysis was not a “significant invasion of privacy,” it
nevertheless deemed it an “intrusion.” Id. Finally, the Court weighed the personal
“intrusion” of the analysis against the state’s interest in using the results of the
analysis. Id. at 1970. This identification of an “intrusion” that the state’s interest
must overcome shows that the Court attributed some Fourth Amendment
significance to the analysis of DNA. See id. at 1977. The Court did not go so far as to
use Skinner as a conduit to classify analysis of a biological sample as a “further
invasion” independent of the biological sample’s extraction. See id. at 1978.
However, the Court still defended the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
in the analysis of his or her biological sample, even though such expectation was
lumped together with the individual’s expectation of privacy regarding extraction
of his or her biological sample. See id. at 1979–80.
53. See supra note 29.
54. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
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required to conduct a breath test.55 The Court found that analysis of
the DNA sample in King was more intrusive than breath testing in
general because authorities in the King case could have used the
DNA sample to find a “wealth of . . . highly personal information.”56
The Court in Birchfield reasoned that the potential for discovery of
highly personal information in King was significant regardless of the
fact that the law did not allow authorities to use DNA evidence to
extract personal and medical information from King.57
Therefore, from its 1989 Skinner decision to its 2016 Birchfield
decision, the United States Supreme Court has continuously
categorized the analysis of biological material obtained from a
suspects’ blood draw as at least a search that is part of a Fourth
Amendment event and at most a Fourth Amendment event in and
of itself.
B.

Limitations on Search and Seizure Law
1.

Minnesota Requires Warrant Affidavits and Applications to Be
Particularized and Establish Probable Cause

The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that an
application for a search warrant, “interpreted in a common-sense
and realistic manner, must be found to contain information which
would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the
articles sought are located at the place to be searched.”58 Further, a
reviewing magistrate must determine in a “common-sense and
practical manner” whether or not the submitted warrant application
and affidavit give rise to the probable cause needed for the
magistrate to issue the warrant.59 In reviewing the warrant
application and affidavit, the issuing magistrate must evaluate the
“totality of the circumstances” available to him or her through the
affidavit, not the actual circumstances known to the officer
requesting the warrant.60

55. Id. at 2177.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 858 (Minn. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Rosillo v. State, 278 N.W.2d 747, 748–49 (Minn. 1979)).
59. State v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v.
Eggler, 372 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).
60. Id. at 18 (citing State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985)).
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The court recognizes that the magistrate’s decision to issue a
warrant is tied to the level of detail provided to him or her in the
affidavit, and the decision depends on whether these details
adequately describe probable cause of a nexus between the
contraband, the location of the contraband, and the individual.61
Even if a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant is challenged, the
reviewing court is expected to “pay great deference to the
magistrate’s determination.”62 The reviewing court “may not engage
in a hypertechnical examination of the affidavit.”63
2.

Minnesota Courts Allow Flexibility in Achieving Warrant
Particularity

Minnesota has agreed with the United States Supreme Court
that a search must be limited in scope to the circumstances that gave
rise to the search.64 Further, the Particularity Clause of the Fourth
Amendment limits warranted searches to the scope of the warrant.65
A search has not gone beyond the scope of the warrant if the court
considers the search’s relationship to the warrant to be
“reasonable.”66 Minnesota courts grant a “degree of flexibility” in
determining whether such a warranted search has violated the
Particularity Clause.67 The Minnesota Supreme Court has specifically
noted that “[a] warrant which describes things in broad and generic
terms may be valid when the description is as specific as the

61. Id. at 18–19. For example, in Kahn, the Minnesota Court of Appeals barred
evidence obtained from a search warrant that had been issued subsequent to an
officer’s application and affidavit listing a loose association between the contraband,
its location, and the individual. Id. at 18. The warrant application and affidavit
described an amount of cocaine that had been seized from the respondent’s person,
the address of where the respondent was known to have lived (at least seventy-five
miles from the place the respondent was detained), and the officer’s assessment
that such an amount of cocaine found on respondent usually means there is a larger
selling operation in progress. Id.
62. Id. (citing Eggler, 372 N.W.2d at 15).
63. Id.
64. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
65. State v. Soua Thao Yang, 352 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
66. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
67. State v. Poole, 499 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Minn. 1993).
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circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation
permit.”68
3.

In 2016, the United States Supreme Court Recognized a Warrant
Application’s Power to Inform the Warrant in Birchfield

In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court
evaluated three cases—two cases originating in North Dakota and
one case originating in Minnesota.69 In the Minnesota case, the
defendant refused to take a warrantless breath test after having been
arrested and taken to the police station.70 The Court reasoned that
in the Minnesota case (as well in as the two North Dakota cases), if
the police had obtained a warrant prior to administering a breath
test, “the scope of the warrant would [have simply been] a BAC test
of the arrestee.”71 The Court concluded that a warrant requirement
for all breath tests is unnecessary because the officers’
characterizations of facts are substantially similar across most drunk
driving stops.72 The Court noted that if warrants were required for
all breath tests, many warrants would be substantially similar to each
other and would waste time recounting facts common to all DUI
cases.73 Because such a scripted recitation of facts from the officer to
the warrant-issuing judge would be a waste of time, police are not
required to burden magistrates by obtaining warrants before
performing breath tests on suspected drunk drivers.74
68. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Hannuksela,
452 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Minn. 1990)). For example, a warrant allowing the seizure
and search of the complete patient profiles of all women treated for family practice
services by a doctor who was suspected of criminal sexual activity was deemed to
have not been overbroad, because the extent of the doctor’s suspected criminal
sexual activity was unknown. Id.
69. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2162–63 (2016).
70. Id. at 2163.
71. Id. at 2181.
72. Id. (“In order to persuade a magistrate that there is probable cause for a
search warrant, the officer would typically recite the same facts that led the officer
to find that there was probable cause for arrest.”). The Court describes how police
observations of DUI suspects often rely on common themes, such as “a strong odor
of alcohol, that the motorist wobbled when attempting to stand, that the motorist
paused when reciting the alphabet or counting backwards, and so on.” Id. Despite
this seeming monotony in warrant applications and affidavits, the Court points out,
regarding the power of the warrant-applying officer, “A magistrate would be in a
poor position to challenge such characterizations.” Id.
73. Id. at 2181–82.
74. Id. at 2181–82, 2184.
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The Court’s reasoning and conclusion in Birchfield regarding
breath tests identify great power in Minnesota warrant applications
and affidavits. By asserting that facts are substantially similar in most
drunk driving stops and by asserting that the scope of the warrant in
the Minnesota case would have been tied to the facts given by the
detaining officer had the warrant been issued, the Court implies that
a Minnesota warrant derives its authority largely from the facts of the
incident as communicated by the detaining officer rather than from
the judge who issues the warrant based on these facts. Thus,
according to the Supreme Court, a warrant is unnecessary to verify
the facts leading up to most blood draws. The warrant is only
important in assessing the constitutionality of intrusions into
suspects’ expectations of privacy regarding blood draws and blood
analyses.75
III. STATE V. FAWCETT CASE DESCRIPTION
A.

Facts and Procedural Posture

On May 24, 2014, at an intersection in Blaine, Minnesota, Debra
Fawcett drove through a red light and crashed into another vehicle.76
The collision left the driver of the other vehicle bleeding and with
either a broken leg or ankle.77 Fawcett also sustained minor
injuries.78 As Fawcett talked with an officer who arrived at the scene
of the crash, the officer perceived alcohol on Fawcett’s breath.79
“Fawcett admitted [to the officer] she had consumed ‘two to three
beers’ earlier.”80 Medical personnel arrived after this conversation
and took Fawcett to Mercy Hospital.81
As Fawcett was being taken to Mercy Hospital, a police detective
submitted an application for a search warrant82 requesting

75. This reasoning explains why the Birchfield Court required warrants for
blood tests but not for breath tests. Id. at 2187.
76. State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn. 2016).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Although pre-Birchfield Minnesota law in 2014, like the law of other states
at that time, allowed police to force drivers to submit to warrantless blood draws in
certain circumstances under the doctrine of “implied consent,” police chose to
obtain a warrant anyway in Fawcett’s case. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2162–63. This
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permission to secure “a blood sample of [Fawcett] as evidence of the
crime of criminal vehicular operation/homicide.”83 Portions of the
warrant application and supporting affidavit especially descriptive of
Fawcett’s perceived condition of impairment were as follows:
• “Fawcett admitted to the officers that she was driving and
had been drinking prior to the crash.”84
• “From their investigation, officers formed the belief that at
the time of the collision . . . Fawcett was the driver and was
under the influence of alcohol.”85
• “Fawcett admitted to responding officers that she had two
or three drinks just prior to the crash, she smelled of an
alcoholic beverage and it was apparent to officers on-scene
that she had been drinking.”86
The warrant application and supporting affidavit made no mention
of any suspicion of the presence of drugs in Fawcett’s system.
The judge to whom the warrant application and affidavit were
submitted issued a warrant allowing the police to direct a draw of
Fawcett’s blood at Mercy Hospital and to send the blood to an
approved lab for testing.87 The judge reasoned that the blood
“constitutes evidence which tends to show a crime has been
committed, or tends to show that a particular person has committed
a crime.” Regarding the timeliness of the warrant’s issuance, the
judge noted that “[d]ue to the dissipation of alcohol/drugs in the
human body this warrant may be served at anytime during the day
or night.”88
precaution may indicate Minnesota police suspected that a Birchfield-like decision
was imminent, and they may have wanted to justify their actions against foreseeable
legal challenges.
83. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 382. Note that although the police suspected Fawcett
had committed the crime of “criminal vehicular operation/homicide,” this does not
imply that Fawcett committed criminal vehicular homicide. “Criminal vehicular
operation/homicide” was simply the then-current statutory language of a crime that
could be committed either by criminal vehicular operation that resulted in bodily
harm or by criminal vehicular operation that resulted in a death. See MINN. STAT.
§ 609.21 (2007) (renumbered MINN. STAT. §§ 609.2111–.2114 on Aug. 1, 2014).
There are now separate offenses for criminal vehicular homicide, MINN. STAT.
§ 609.2112 (2016), and criminal vehicular operation with bodily harm, § 609.2113
(2016).
84. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 383–84.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 383.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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The police went to Mercy Hospital and presented the signed
warrant.89 Fawcett completed a preliminary breath test (PBT), and a
medical professional drew a sample of her blood.90 The PBT read
.000.91 Fawcett told the police that “she was depressed and was
currently taking Lorazepam and Wellbutrin.”92 Police submitted
Fawcett’s blood sample to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(“BCA”) to be analyzed.93
On June 24, 2014, the BCA reported that it had not found any
ethyl alcohol in Fawcett’s blood sample.94 Nevertheless, the report
maintained that “additional toxicology report(s) [would] follow.”95
On September 9, 2014, the BCA reported that Fawcett’s blood
“contained a metabolite of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and
Alprazolam at the time of the accident.”96
On October 16, 2014, the State filed a complaint charging
Fawcett with criminal vehicular operation under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.21, subdivision 1(2)(ii).97 The statute reads, “A person is
guilty of criminal vehicular homicide or operation . . . if the person
causes injury to or the death of another as a result of operating a
motor vehicle . . . in a negligent manner while under the influence
of . . . a controlled substance.”98
Fawcett motioned to suppress “all evidence of the presence of
drugs.”99 She argued that the warrant did not give the police the
authority to test her blood for the presence of controlled
substances.100 The trial court granted Fawcett’s motion to suppress
evidence of the presence of drugs in her blood.101 The trial court
ruled that the warrant allowed authorities to draw Fawcett’s blood
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. MINN. STAT. § 609.21, subdiv. 1(2)(ii) (2012). Since the State did not
charge Fawcett with criminal vehicular homicide or operation involving a
combination of one or more controlled substances and alcohol according to MINN.
STAT. § 609.21, subdiv. 1(2)(iii), it follows that at some point, the State realized its
mistaken reliance on the idea that Fawcett was under the influence of alcohol.
99. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 383.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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and analyze it for the presence of alcohol but, after initial testing
results indicated there was no alcohol in Fawcett’s blood, not for the
presence of drugs.102 The trial court reasoned that the testing of
Fawcett’s blood should have been “limited in scope to the probable
cause presented in the application and affidavit, namely, a search of
[Fawcett’s] blood to obtain evidence of alcohol use.”103
The State appealed the trial court’s suppression of the
secondary testing of Fawcett’s blood for drugs, arguing that the
results of that test provided its sole proof that Fawcett was under the
influence of a controlled substance during the crash.104 The issue of
whether the testing of a blood draw was an independent Fourth
Amendment event was a matter of first impression for the Minnesota
Court of Appeals.105 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the
suppression order,106 reasoning that no one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a blood sample that has been lawfully
taken.107 The court held that because Fawcett did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her blood, the testing of her
blood was “not a distinct Fourth Amendment event.”108 Fawcett
subsequently petitioned to the Minnesota Supreme Court,109 and the
court granted review.110
B.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals to reverse the suppression of the drug
testing of Fawcett’s blood sample.111 Substantively, the Minnesota

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 383–84.
105. State v. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]here is
no binding authority of which we are aware considering whether the chemical
analysis of blood is a Fourth Amendment event distinct from the blood draw itself.”),
aff’d, 884 N.W.2d 380.
106. Id. at 556.
107. Id. at 561.
108. Id.
109. Petition for Further Review and Addendum, Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380 (No.
A15-0938),http://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us/ctrack/view/publicCaseMaintenance
.do?csNameID=80658&csInstanceID=92541#.
110. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384.
111. Id. at 388.
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Supreme Court allowed evidence of Fawcett’s drug use to be
presented at Fawcett’s criminal trial.112
The reasoning the Minnesota Supreme Court gave for vacating
the trial court’s suppression order differs dramatically from the
reasoning given by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The supreme
court acknowledged that Fawcett had some expectation of privacy in
her blood sample even after the blood sample was drawn.113 The
supreme court dodged the issue of whether Fawcett’s expectation of
privacy was “reasonable” by concluding that at any rate, the warrant
was valid and was sufficient to overcome any expectation of privacy,
reasonable or unreasonable, that Fawcett had about her blood.114
The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not need to grapple with the
issue of reasonableness due to its denial of the existence of any
expectation of privacy Fawcett might have had in her blood.115
In her brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Fawcett argued
that since the warrant application and affidavit only gave evidence of
her alcohol use and did not present any evidence of the use of
controlled substances, the corresponding warrant failed in two ways:
the warrant did not give the police probable cause to re-search the
blood for the presence of controlled substances,116 and it was
overbroad in indiscriminately allowing all types of testing to be
conducted on her blood, therefore violating the Particularity Clause
of the Fourth Amendment.117 To bolster her argument of the
warrant’s overbreadth, Fawcett submitted a letter of supplemental
authority to the Minnesota Supreme Court on June 27, 2016,
explaining that the United States Supreme Court’s June 23, 2016,
decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota clarified that when seized
through the use of a warrant, a blood sample can only be tested to
the extent allowable under that warrant.118
112. Id. at 382, 388.
113. Id. at 384 n.3.
114. Id. (noting that since the warrant was found to be a valid basis for the
testing, the court did not need to resolve the exact extent of the expectation of
privacy Fawcett retained in her blood).
115. See generally State v. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d,
884 N.W.2d 380.
116. Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 13–33, Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555 (No.
A15-0938).
117. See id. at 33–45.
118. Appellant’s Letter of Citation of Supplemental Authority at 1, Fawcett, 877
N.W.2d 555 (No. A15-0938) (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160
(2016)).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged the significance
of Birchfield in establishing an expectation of privacy in one’s blood
sample, which a warrant must overcome.119 However, the court
rejected both of appellant Fawcett’s arguments regarding the
insufficiency of the warrant.120 In rejecting Fawcett’s argument about
the lack of probable cause, the court explained that it was upholding
the probable cause standard by requiring warrant-issuing judges to
have theoretically reasoned that the facts in the warrant application
and affidavit provide a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.”121
The Minnesota Supreme Court explained that when there is
dispute as to whether there is enough probable cause to justify a
search warrant, deference is given to a warrant-issuing magistrate’s
inferences.122 This deference does not extend to the applicant’s
interpretation of the information that he or she provided the
magistrate.123
The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that based on the
totality of the facts presented in the warrant application and the
affidavit, including facts describing Fawcett’s crash and the police’s
perception of Fawcett’s condition, “the issuing judge [had] a
substantial basis to conclude there was a fair probability that
evidence of criminal vehicular operation would be found in
Fawcett’s blood.”124 Specifically, the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that the warrant-issuing judge in Fawcett had a substantial
basis to infer that there may have been more intoxicants in Fawcett’s
blood than just alcohol.125 Accordingly, the belief that the blood
119. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3.
120. Id. at 384–88.
121. Id. at 385 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 223
(Minn. 2010)).
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)) (“The requirement that a
warrant be obtained is a requirement that inferences to support the search ‘be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”).
124. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385.
125. The Minnesota Supreme Court did acknowledge that the warrant and
supporting affidavit stated that “Fawcett was the driver and was under the influence
of alcohol.” Id. However, it seems the court wanted to downplay the affiant’s strong
assertion of Fawcett’s impairment by alcohol by avoiding use of the word “alcohol.”
The court used the phrases “under the influence” and “impaired” in describing how
the warrant-issuing magistrate may have interpreted the warrant application and
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would contain “evidence of criminal vehicular operation” was
sufficiently particular as tested from the standpoint of the warrantissuing judge, and the judge’s decision to issue the warrant was not
so unreasonable that the Minnesota Supreme Court would overturn
it.126
The Minnesota Supreme Court also rejected Fawcett’s
argument that the warrant violated the Particularity Clause and was
overbroad in its direction to send “Fawcett’s blood sample ‘to an
approved lab for testing.’”127 In rejecting this argument, the court
reasoned that the warrant-issuing judge had properly weighed “the
circumstances of the case . . . , as well as the nature of the crime
under investigation and whether a more precise description [was]
possible under the circumstances.”128 The court held that the
warrant was not overbroad in the particular circumstances at hand
because it authorized the search of Fawcett’s blood for “evidence of
the crime of criminal vehicular operation/homicide.”129 This
categorization is broader than a hypothetically similar order limiting
the search of Fawcett’s blood to only signs of alcohol use. However,
the court reasoned that such broadening was lawful because
Minnesota law limited the search to discovery of the presence of
“alcohol and/or controlled substances.”130 Further, the court
reasoned that the search was limited in that it did not authorize the
testing of Fawcett’s blood for health or DNA information.131
C.

The Dissents

Justices Stras, Lillehaug, and Hudson dissented.132 None of
these three dissenting justices found the majority’s requirement that
the warrant have probable cause and particularity for both the blood
draw and the blood analysis133 to be objectionable.134 In fact, they

affidavit instead of “under the influence of alcohol” or “impaired by alcohol.” See id. at
386 (describing Fawcett as “under the influence” or “impaired”).
126. Id. at 385.
127. Id. at 387.
128. Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 713 (Minn. 2003)).
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.21, subdiv. 1(2) (2007)).
131. Id. at 387–88.
132. Id. at 388–91.
133. See id. at 384–87.
134. See id. at 388–91.
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complimented the majority’s reasoning by further explaining the
need for the testing of the blood sample to be tied to the warrant.135
The dissents simply found that the majority’s conclusion, that
the warrant and the application documents the warrant relied upon
had facts sufficient to establish probable cause,136 was made without
proper consideration of the warrant applicant’s affidavit.137 The
dissents were largely in agreement on where the majority erred.138
Justice Stras’s dissent, joined by Justices Lillehaug and Hudson as to
the first two parts, contended that the warrant application only
established probable cause for the presence of alcohol in Fawcett’s
blood, not the presence of controlled substances.139 Justice Stras
further contended, in a similar vein, that there were no direct facts
to support a warrant-issuing judge’s possible inference that Fawcett
was intoxicated by anything other than alcohol.140 Finally, Justice
Stras pointed out that the affidavit’s statement that police “sought
evidence of the crime of criminal vehicular operation/homicide”

135. All the dissenting justices agreed with the majority’s first point—that blood
draws require warrants with sufficient particularity. Id. at 389 (Stras, J., dissenting)
(citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990)) (“The permissible extent of
the invasion is tied to the scope of the warrant.”); id. at 391 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting)
(joining the dissent of Justice Stras in parts I and II); id. (Hudson, J., dissenting)
(joining the dissent of Justice Lillehaug).
136. Id. at 385 (majority opinion) (“[T]he issuing judge had a substantial basis
to conclude there was a fair probability that evidence of intoxicants, whether
alcohol, controlled substances, or a combination of alcohol and controlled
substances would be found in Fawcett’s blood.”).
137. Id. at 390 (Stras, J., dissenting) (“The fact that the affidavit generally
references the suspected crime [of criminal vehicular homicide or operation] is of
little assistance.”); id. at 391 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Stras and
reiterating that “[t]he search-warrant application and affidavit, on their face, failed
to establish probable cause for the search of appellant’s blood for controlled
substances”); id. (Hudson, J., dissenting) (joining the dissent of Justice Lillehaug).
138. Id. at 388–91 (Stras, J., dissenting) (organizing the dissent into three parts:
(I) recollection of facts, (II) critique of unlikely inferences the majority awards the
issuing judge and critique of undue expansion of probable cause, and (III)
discussion of adopting the good faith exception in Minnesota); id. at 391 (Lillehaug,
J., dissenting) (joining the dissent of Justice Stras in parts I and II but not in part
III); id. (Hudson, J., dissenting) (joining the dissent of Justice Lillehaug). Justices
Lillehaug and Hudson did not join Justice Stras in his discussion of the good faith
exception to the warrant requirement because they felt that since the parties did
not mention the good faith exception, the court should not address the issue. Id. at
391 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 388 (Stras, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 389–90.
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was “vague and conclusory” and that such language should have
been insufficient to establish a basis to issue a warrant.141
Justice Stras detoured into a brief discussion of the good faith
exception. He explained that the Supreme Court has permitted
states to accept evidence police obtained with a faulty warrant when
the police believed in good faith that the warrant was valid.142 Justice
Stras further explained that Minnesota has elected to apply the
“good faith” exception “only when officers act pursuant to binding
appellate precedent.”143 He concluded that he would have been
willing to consider adopting the good faith exception in full had the
parties made arguments on this point.144
IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett decision was subject to
pressure from two competing policy ideals: state concerns of
enforcing justice and individuals’ privacy concerns. On the one
hand, testing of blood samples is helpful to state concerns of
identifying suspects pursuant to pre-trial holding and other
administrative needs145 and determining whether a suspected
criminal was under an illegal level of substance influence at the time
of the crime.146 On the other hand, testing blood samples may
141. Id. at 390 (quoting State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Minn. 1998)).
142. Id. at 390–91.
143. Id. at 391 (quoting State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 876 (Minn. 2015)).
Minnesota’s partial adoption of the “good faith” warrant exception is less expansive
than the Supreme Court’s adoption of the same exception. Id. at 391 (Lillehaug, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stras believes the Fawcett case is “so similar to Leon, the seminal
good-faith exception case, that there is little to distinguish them.” Id. (Stras, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). Yet, because the
Minnesota Supreme Court did not apply the good faith exception in Fawcett, it had
to rely on what Justice Stras considered an “unnatural stretching” of probable cause
to include probable cause of drug use. Id.
144. Id. It is unclear whether Justice Stras is alone in his willingness to consider
Minnesota’s full adoption of the “good faith” exception to the warrant requirement,
but the rest of the justices’ responses indicate that they are unwilling to proactively
rule on the “good faith” exception until the issue is raised by parties before the
court. See id. (Lillehaug, J., dissenting); id. (Hudson, J., dissenting). Justice Lillehaug
expressly declined to engage with Justice Stras’s exploration into the “good faith”
exception for just this reason. Id. (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). A similar disposition of
the majority justices might be inferred by the fact that they ignored the good faith
exception in their opinion.
145. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
146. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–72 (1966) (deeming a
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compromise individuals’ privacy concerns because a person’s blood
contains a “host of private medical facts”147 and a “wealth of
additional, highly personal information.”148 The existence of a
person’s medical facts and personal information in his or her blood
has given courts pause and reason to consider whether or not an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her blood
that must be overcome by the government’s interest in the search.149
In resolving the competing policy considerations of state
concerns and individuals’ privacy concerns, the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Fawcett makes two major assertions:
(1) The testing of a blood draw is a search.150
(2) A warrant for a blood draw must particularly describe how
the blood will be tested.151
Regarding the first assertion, the court’s rule that blood testing
is a search raises a number of questions about the standards
governing the state’s intrusion into an individual’s expectation of
privacy.152 Chief among these questions are the following:
(1) Is categorizing testing of a blood sample as a search in line
with precedential authority?
(2) Did the court properly identify the level of privacy
expectation Fawcett had in her blood?
(3) Did the court err by not characterizing Fawcett’s seizure and
subsequent blood draw and analysis as one Fourth
Amendment event, as other states have classified the process
of a blood draw and testing?
The following analysis shows that (1) the classification of the
testing of Fawcett’s blood sample as a search was proper because this
framework is in line with United States Supreme Court precedent,

warrantless blood draw sufficient to convict the petitioner of drunk driving due to
exigent circumstances).
147. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
148. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (2016).
149. The government’s interest in conducting a search does not automatically
trump any individual expectation of privacy because such an expectation of privacy
is a basic right protected by the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (“The
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”).
150. See infra Section IV.A.
151. See infra Section IV.B.
152. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618–19 (1989) (“To hold that the Fourth
Amendment is applicable to the drug and alcohol testing . . . is only to begin the
inquiry into the standards governing such intrusions.”).
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though it departs from existing Minnesota case law and the case law
of other states;153 (2) the level of Fawcett’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in her blood was properly identified;154 and (3) the court
properly avoided categorizing the seizure and search of Fawcett’s
blood as one Fourth Amendment event. 155
Regarding the second assertion made in Fawcett, the court’s rule
that a warrant for a blood draw must particularly describe how the
blood will be tested is proper in light of controlling precedent.
However, the assertion invites a number of questions necessary in
evaluating whether such particularity was met in Fawcett’s situation.
Chief among these questions are the following:
(1) Since the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Fawcett decision did
not address whether the items to be found in a blood draw
need to be identified by a particularized warrant, was the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s application of the particularity
requirement to the warrant for blood draw and testing
proper?
(2) From whose perspective should the content of the warrant
application be interpreted?
(3) Was the holding that the warrant was particular enough to
authorize the testing of Fawcett’s blood for drugs proper?
The following discussion shows that (1) application of the
warrant’s particularity to the blood draw and testing was proper and
will likely be longstanding;156 (2) the warrant’s particularity should
have been interpreted as from the eyes of the officer submitting the
affidavit, who did not particularly describe the presence of drugs;157
and (3) the ruling that the warrant was particular enough to justify
the search of Fawcett’s blood for the presence of drugs was improper
and sets a harmful precedent.158 Since the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s answers to (2) and (3) did not match its correct assertion in
(1) that a warrant for a blood draw must particularly describe how
the blood is to be tested, the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in the
application of its principle.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See infra Section IV.A.1.
See infra Section IV.A.2.
See infra Section IV.A.3.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
See infra Section IV.B.3.
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The Testing of a Blood Draw Is a Search
1.

Classification of the Testing of Fawcett’s Blood Sample as a Search
Was Proper

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s conclusion that Fawcett’s
blood draw and testing was a search159 is well supported by recent
United States Supreme Court precedent. This Supreme Court
precedent identifies two distinct ways in which a blood draw and
testing intrude upon expectations of privacy, thus constituting a
search.
First, a blood draw and testing intrude upon an individual’s
reasonable expectation of physical privacy by entering a person’s
body in a somewhat violent manner.160 Fawcett’s skin was pierced by
a needle which subsequently entered her body and drew blood from
her body. Through this process, Fawcett’s reasonable expectation of
physical privacy was intruded upon.
In 2013, the United States Supreme Court held in Maryland v.
King that even such an unobtrusive intrusion as a buccal swab, a
piece of cotton rubbed on the inside of a suspect’s cheek, and the
buccal swab’s subsequent testing is still a search.161 The King holding
is applicable to all techniques used to take biological samples that
the Supreme Court has ruled on because of all such techniques, a
buccal swab is arguably the least physically intrusive.162 It follows that
more physically intrusive techniques, like the blood draw Fawcett was
subject to, are also searches.163
Second, in addition to a blood draw’s intrusion into a person’s
expectation of physical privacy, the testing of the drawn blood
intrudes upon an individual’s expectation of medical and personal
privacy. Having already established in Skinner v. Railway Labor

159. See State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. 2016) (“[T]he issuing
judge limited the search of Fawcett’s blood.”).
160. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2163 (2016) (citing
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013)) (“Our cases establish that the taking of a
blood sample . . . is a search.”).
161. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968–69 (“It can be agreed that using a buccal swab on
the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”).
162. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.6(a) (5th ed. 2016) (pointing out
that “any lingering doubts” as to whether techniques less intrusive than blood draws
and testing still amounted to searches “were swept away by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Maryland v. King”).
163. See id.
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Executives’ Ass’n that an individual’s blood contains a “host of private
medical facts,”164 the Court in Birchfield v. North Dakota added that
that blood contains a “wealth of additional, highly personal
information.”165 The fact that Fawcett was a reasonable individual
who knew her blood contained personal and medical information is
exemplified by Fawcett’s declaration to police that “she was
depressed and was currently taking Lorazepam and Wellbutrin.”166
Fawcett may not have revealed that she suffered from such a
stigmatized illness as depression had it not been for the fact that she
was or was about to be subjected to testing she thought would reveal
such information anyway. United States Supreme Court precedent
in Skinner and Birchfield has validated that such a reasonable
expectation of privacy is intruded upon when blood is tested.
The conclusion that the testing of a blood draw is a search is
new precedent for the state of Minnesota.167 Although the Minnesota
Supreme Court did not overrule Harrison v. Commissioner of Public
Safety,168 its conclusion that testing a blood draw constitutes a search
164. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
165. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177.
166. State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Minn. 2016).
167. Prior to Fawcett, the authoritative interpretation of whether the testing of a
blood sample was a search was the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 2010 Harrison
decision, which found that such testing did not constitute a search. See Harrison v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); supra note 41.
Following Harrison, even after the United States Supreme Court released its
Maryland v. King decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held in Fawcett that “[i]f
the state lawfully obtains a blood sample for the purpose of chemical analysis, then
a chemical analysis of the sample that does not offend standards of reasonableness
is not a separate search requiring a warrant.” State v. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555, 561
(Minn. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 884 N.W.2d 380. Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s decision of Fawcett was the first time the court addressed the issue of whether
a blood sample’s testing was a search. Contrary to the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
Harrison and Fawcett decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court viewed the testing of
the blood draw as indeed a search. See Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 387 (“[T]he issuing
judge limited the search of Fawcett’s blood.”).
168. Perhaps the Minnesota Supreme Court did not overturn Harrison because
Harrison relied on a blood draw that was taken with probable cause and under the
exigency exception to the warrant requirement. Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 920–21.
Since the United States Supreme Court issued its 2016 Birchfield decision, reliance
on the exigency exception for blood draws in DUI cases is no longer available
because blood draws and testing now require warrants. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184–
85. Because a warrant is now required in all cases, there is less policy pressure to
categorize blood testing as a non-search. Since a warrant is required for blood draws
and testing anyway, courts might as well concede that such blood draws and tests
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is the first time since Birchfield that the Minnesota Supreme Court
has dealt with this issue. Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s reliance in Fawcett on relevant and very recent United States
Supreme Court precedent is proper.
2.

The Level of Fawcett’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Her
Blood Was Properly Identified

The Minnesota Supreme Court decided that Fawcett did not
lose all expectation of privacy in her blood sample after her blood
was drawn.169 The court has left open for later ruling the question of
exactly how much expectation of privacy an individual has in his or
her blood sample once it is taken from the body.170 However, since
the testing of Fawcett’s blood has been characterized as a search,171
it can be inferred by the definition of a “search”172 that Fawcett’s
expectation of privacy in her blood is at least reasonable.
The Minnesota Supreme Court denied the reasonableness of
Fawcett’s expectation of privacy in medical information that could
be found in her blood because the warrant precluded using her

are searches. Denial of the fact that blood testing is a search, or at least part of a
search, no longer has the policy benefit of easing law enforcement’s ability to seize
a suspect’s blood. Thus, the habit of many states to categorize blood testing as a nonsearch might cease altogether. Another reason the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Fawcett may have chosen not to overturn Harrison is that the Minnesota Court of
Appeals said in Harrison that the defendant did not have a “legitimate expectation
of privacy,” Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 921, which the Minnesota Court of Appeals
equated with being a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. (“[A] legitimate
expectation of privacy [is] defined as ‘those expectations of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”). Therefore, although the court in Harrison
concluded that the defendant was not searched, this is due to the fact that the
defendant’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable, not that the defendant had
no expectation of privacy whatsoever. This is a much less drastic or obviously errant
position than saying that the defendant was not searched at all. Accordingly,
perhaps the Minnesota Supreme Court in Fawcett did not overturn Harrison because
Harrison was not an obvious candidate for reversal.
169. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3.
170. Id. (“We need not resolve in this case the exact extent of the expectation
of privacy Fawcett retained in her blood because, as explained below, we conclude
that the warrant provided a valid basis for the controlled substance testing.”).
171. Id. at 387 (“[T]he issuing judge limited the search of Fawcett’s blood.”).
172. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“A ‘search’ occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed.”).
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blood sample for this purpose.173 However, the United States
Supreme Court noted in Birchfield, commenting on its King decision,
that although the authorities in King were legally allowed to use the
defendant’s DNA only for identification purposes, the authorities
could have obtained the defendant’s personal information from the
sample, albeit illegally, if they had chosen to do so.174 Therefore, the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s denial of Fawcett’s expectation of
privacy in medical information that could be found in her blood
does not account for the real possibility of illegal government
intrusion that the United States Supreme Court is wary of.
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in
Fawcett of general, unspecified expectations of privacy is a proper
concession that the court rightfully acknowledges to have been set
in motion by United States Supreme Court precedent in Skinner and
recently in Birchfield.175
3.

The Court Properly Avoided Categorizing Fawcett’s Blood Draw
and Subsequent Analysis as One Fourth Amendment Event

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett decision properly
changed the trajectory of blood draw testing case law by not
categorizing Fawcett’s blood draw and the subsequent analysis of
that blood as one Fourth Amendment event. It departed from the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 2010 decision in Harrison, which
assigned individuals no expectation of privacy in their blood samples
once the blood was drawn and held that testing such samples was not
173. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 378–88 (“Contrary to Fawcett’s assertion, the search
warrant in this case did not authorize general testing of Fawcett’s blood to
determine her DNA, genome, or indicators of diseases because such testing would
not have revealed any evidence of criminal vehicular operation/homicide.”).
174. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (“Although the DNA
obtained under the law at issue in that case could lawfully be used only for
identification purposes, the process put into the possession of law enforcement
authorities a sample from which a wealth of additional, highly personal information
could potentially be obtained.”). Regarding the effect that this potential abuse of
power has on the individual whose blood has been seized, the Court wrote, “Even if
the law enforcement agency is precluded from testing the blood for any purpose
other than to measure BAC, the potential remains and may result in anxiety for the
person tested.” Id. at 2178.
175. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3 (citing Skinner for the proposition that an
individual has an expectation of privacy in the medical facts a blood test reveals, and
citing Birchfield for the proposition that an individual has an expectation of privacy
in the personal information a blood test reveals).
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a search.176 In its departure from Harrison, the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Fawcett established that there was both a seizure and a
search in the process of Fawcett’s blood draw and the subsequent
testing.177 This acknowledgement that the process of a DUI blood
draw and analysis consists of a seizure and a separate search is similar
to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Schmerber.178
Although Fawcett’s characterization of the process of a blood
draw and subsequent analysis as a seizure and a search is similar to
such characterization in Schmerber, it differs from the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of Schmerber in Snyder. In Snyder, the Ninth Circuit
unceremoniously lumped together the seizure of a blood draw and
the blood’s search, labeling these as one Fourth Amendment
event.179 However, even though several state courts have followed
Snyder’s interpretation of Schmerber,180 including the Minnesota
Court of Appeals in its decision of Fawcett,181 the policy reason for
connecting seizure of a blood draw with its subsequent search—
making it easier to seize blood with substances in it before these
substances dissipate—no longer exists. After the United States
176. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010).
177. See Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 (“The warrant authorized the police to seize
Fawcett’s blood . . . .”); id. at 387 (“[T]he issuing judge limited the search of
Fawcett’s blood.”).
178. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“Such testing
procedures plainly constitute searches of ‘persons,’ and depend antecedently upon
seizures of ‘persons,’ within the meaning of that Amendment.”).
179. United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 473–74 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It seems
clear, however, that Schmerber viewed the seizure and separate search of the blood as
a single event for fourth amendment purposes.”).
180. See supra note 29.
181. State v. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 884
N.W.2d 380 (“Once a blood sample has been lawfully removed from a person’s
body, a person loses an expectation of privacy in the blood sample, and a subsequent
chemical analysis of the blood sample is, therefore, not a distinct Fourth
Amendment event.”). Notice here the evolution of the standard from Schmerber to
the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Fawcett decision: Schmerber said there is a seizure
and a search in the process of a blood draw. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. Snyder said
the seizure and search are both part of one Fourth Amendment event. Snyder, 852
F.2d at 473–74. At that point, it was much easier for the Minnesota Court of Appeals
to say in Fawcett that when blood is removed from a person’s body, that person no
longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her blood and therefore
there was no “distinct Fourth Amendment event” in analyzing the blood because
Snyder had already negated the distinctiveness of the blood’s analysis (the search)
by lumping it together with the blood’s seizure.
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Supreme Court’s 2016 Birchfield decision, virtually all blood draws
now need to be justified with time-consuming warrants anyway, and
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is
no longer applicable to all DUI blood draw cases.182 Thus, in light of
this new warrant requirement for virtually all DUI blood draw cases,
states like Minnesota might as well acknowledge that blood draws
and blood testing are separate Fourth Amendment events; they no
longer need to worry that such a concession will increase their
workload.
B.

A Warrant for a Blood Draw Must Particularly Describe How the
Blood Will Be Tested
1.

Application of the Warrant’s Particularity to the Blood Draw and
Testing Was Proper and Will Likely Be Longstanding

The main reason the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett
opinion is written so differently than the Minnesota Court of
Appeals’ Fawcett opinion is that the opinions focused on different
issues altogether. In the Minnesota Court of Appeals opinion, the
issue of blood draws and the Particularity Clause regarding blood
draws was a matter of first impression.183 In holding that an
individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
or her blood sample once Minnesota authorities have legally drawn
the sample, and in holding that the subsequent testing of said sample
is not a distinct Fourth Amendment event,184 the Minnesota Court
of Appeals shut the door on the question of particularity altogether.
If there is no expectation of privacy, then there is no search. If there
is no search, then there is no intrusion. If there is no intrusion, then
there is no need for a warrant that would particularly describe items
to be searched. The Minnesota Supreme Court re-opened this issue
by acknowledging that Fawcett had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in her blood sample.185
Unlike the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota
Supreme Court had the opportunity to engage with the question of
182. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016) (“[The states] have
offered no satisfactory justification for demanding [blood draws] without a
warrant.”).
183. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d at 559.
184. See id. at 561.
185. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3 (“We agree with Fawcett that she did not lose
all expectation of privacy in her blood that was seized pursuant to a warrant.”).
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sufficient particularity in its Fawcett decision because it
acknowledged that the testing of a blood draw is a search that
requires a warrant.186 After engaging with the question of sufficient
particularity in Fawcett’s case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
ultimately rejected Fawcett’s argument that the warrant was not
sufficiently particular.187 It concluded that “the authorization to
submit Fawcett’s blood sample ‘to an approved lab for testing’ meets
minimal constitutional standards for particularity.”188 Nevertheless,
the court’s particularity analysis regarding DUI blood draws and the
court’s implicit recognition of the need for sufficient particularity
has tremendous implications for how Minnesota DUI cases will be
decided in the future. The Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously
agreed that blood draws in fact require warrants with sufficiently
particular descriptions of the testing that will be conducted on the
blood sample.189 This suggests that the court will likely uphold a
sufficient particularity requirement for blood draw warrants in
future cases.190

186. See id. at 387 (“Moreover, by expressly incorporating the warrant
application and supporting affidavit into the warrant, the issuing judge limited the
search of Fawcett’s blood to tests that would reveal ‘evidence of the crime of
criminal vehicular operation/homicide.’”).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 388–91.
190. Perhaps the reason the Minnesota Supreme Court was so emphatic about
characterizing blood draws as searches that require particularity was because the
United States Supreme Court’s Birchfield decision, decided between the Fawcett
decisions at the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court,
had significant implications for the classification of blood draw testing. The
significance of Birchfield being decided at a point when Fawcett had been decided by
the Minnesota Court of Appeals but not by the Minnesota Supreme Court is that
this timing gives an opportunity to see the effect Birchfield had on similar opinions.
Although decided by different judges with different concerns (the Minnesota Court
of Appeals is somewhat more concerned with following precedent and the
Minnesota Supreme Court is more concerned with addressing questions of
importance in interpreting Minnesota’s law and constitution), the facts in both
Fawcett decisions did not change. Accordingly, when an individual’s expectation of
privacy in his or her blood has been recognized at the highest level, courts
nationwide may become very careful about how they analyze the search of that
blood, even when there is a valid warrant, in order to make sure that the warrant is
sufficiently particular in describing the manner in which the blood will be searched
so that the individual’s expectation of privacy is not violated.
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2.

The Warrant’s Particularity Should Have Been Interpreted from
the Eyes of the Officer Submitting the Affidavit, Who Did Not
Particularly Describe the Presence of Drugs

The United States Supreme Court’s 2016 Birchfield decision
viewed Minnesota DUI law as a series of warrants, when warrants
were sought, that dealt with substantially similar sets of facts related
to drunk driving.191 In fact, the Court found the facts in most
Minnesota DUI cases to be so similar that they deemed warrants not
worthwhile and, consequently, unnecessary for breath tests.192 The
Court differentiated blood draws and testing from breath tests only
in that blood draws are more physically intrusive in piercing the
skin193 and cause highly personal information to potentially become
available to authorities.194 However, although the Court in Birchfield
held that both the piercing of the skin and the revelation of highly
personal information to authorities through blood sample testing
are occurrences that trigger the warrant requirement,195 it remains
that, like the pre-intrusion facts of blood draw drunk driving cases,
the facts of breath test drunk driving cases are similar to each other.
It follows that even in cases where a blood draw is sought instead of
or in addition to a breath test, the facts are substantially similar from
one case to the next.196 Thus, warrant-issuing judges are generally
not expected to read new facts into the pre-intrusion situations when
analyzing DUI blood draw warrant applications.
Although the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledges that a
warrant-issuing judge is not to read new facts into the DUI blood
draw situation, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in Fawcett that
the warrant-issuing judge must still review the warrant application
and draw his or her own independent inferences about the
situation.197 In reality, however, the warrant-issuing judge in Fawcett
relied so heavily on the warrant application that the judge “expressly
incorporate[d] the warrant application and supporting affidavit into
the warrant.”198 As explained in the United States Supreme Court

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2181 (2016).
See id. at 2181–82.
Id. at 2178.
Id. at 2177.
Id. at 2184.
See supra Section II.B.3.
State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 385 (Minn. 2016).
Id. at 387.
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case Groh v. Ramirez,199 a reviewing judge may consider warrant
application materials that accompany and are incorporated into the
warrant when construing the scope of the warrant.200 Accordingly,
the warrant’s particularity in Fawcett should have been interpreted
from the eyes of the detective who applied for the warrant because
the warrant-issuing judge knowingly deferred to the detective’s
application materials by incorporating these materials into the
warrant. Since the warrant application materials heavily emphasized
that the arresting officers thought Fawcett was drunk and made no
reference to suspicion of drug use,201 it seems clear that the officer
applying for the warrant did not suspect the presence of drugs in
Fawcett’s blood.202 It follows that since the warrant-issuing judge
relied so heavily on the warrant application materials, and since the
warrant applicant expressed no suspicion of Fawcett’s drug use, the
court should have ruled that the warrant did not describe the
presence of drugs in Fawcett’s blood with sufficient particularity.
3.

The Ruling that the Warrant Was Particular Enough to Justify
the Search of Fawcett’s Blood for the Presence of Drugs Was
Improper and Sets Harmful Precedent

One of the objectionable lessons future Minnesota courts may
learn from the Fawcett decision is that when a Minnesota warrant is
interpreted according to what the issuing judge had a substantial
basis to have reasonably inferred,203 this interpretation is sufficiently
199. 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
200. Id. at 557–58.
201. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385–86.
202. In spite of the fact that the detective applying for a warrant made no
mention of suspecting Fawcett of drug impairment, the Minnesota Supreme Court
makes a bare assertion to the contrary in its concluding paragraph: “The detective
in this case was in possession of facts that established probable cause to believe
evidence of criminal vehicular operation would be found in Fawcett’s blood,
although he did not know whether the intoxicant was alcohol, controlled
substances, or a combination of alcohol and controlled substances.” Id. at 387. This
was the first time in the opinion that the detective’s knowledge was addressed, and
the court did not further discuss why it thought the detective “did not know whether
the intoxicant was alcohol, controlled substances, or a combination of alcohol and
controlled substances.” See id.
203. Id. (“[I]t was not unreasonable for the issuing judge to infer that Fawcett’s
impairment may have been caused by alcohol, controlled substances, or some
combination of the two.”). The United States Supreme Court has concluded that
courts can assume a judicial inference of probable cause as long as there is a
“substantial basis” for that inference. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).
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particular in its description204 even when the language of the warrant
application that has been incorporated into the warrant205 suggests
a narrower interpretation.206 The problem with the path the
Minnesota Supreme Court has chosen is in its foundation. The court
relies on cases that establish the acceptability of judicial inference
when there is a “substantial basis” for probable cause.207 However,
these cases do not involve judicial deference to warrant application
materials through the materials’ incorporation into the warrant.208
The court attempted to connect the deference it gives to potential
judicial inferences with an inference that the warrant applicant—a
detective—might have made about the presence of drugs in
Fawcett’s blood. This grasp at a link between the warrant-issuing
judge’s potential inference and the warrant applicant’s potential
inference seems strained and was not well elaborated.209
204. Courts are more inclined to find sufficient particularity in a judge’s warrant
under the policy that “because the prime function of the warrant requirement is to
secure ‘an independent assessment of the inferences to be drawn from the available
evidence,’ it is axiomatic that an issuing judge is not bound by the inferences drawn
by the officers.” Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385 (citing State v. Nolting, 254 N.W.2d 340,
343 (Minn. 1977)).
205. Id. at 383.
206. See, e.g., id. at 385 (“We acknowledge that the warrant application and
supporting affidavit states that ‘From their investigation, officers formed the belief
that at the time of the collision . . . Fawcett was the driver and was under the
influence of alcohol.’”).
207. State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 1990) (citing Gates, 462
U.S. at 238–39) (“In reviewing the magistrate’s determination the reviewing court
must give deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause and should
uphold the determination if there was a ‘substantial basis’ for the magistrate’s
determination.”).
208. See id. (citing Gates and exhibiting no incorporation of warrant application
materials into the warrant); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 236–39 (citing Jones and
exhibiting no incorporation of warrant application materials into the warrant);
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269–72 (1960) (creating the “substantial basis”
standard, where judicial inference of probable cause is valid if there is a “substantial
basis” for it, but exhibiting no incorporation of warrant application materials into
the warrant).
209. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 387 (“[T]he detective in this case was in possession
of facts that established probable cause to believe evidence of criminal vehicular
operation would be found in Fawcett’s blood, although he did not know whether
the intoxicant was alcohol, controlled substances, or a combination of alcohol and
controlled substances.”). As discussed supra note 202, this assertion of the detective’s
potential inference of the presence of alcohol in Fawcett’s blood is not well
reasoned, making any potential link between the inferences of the judge and the
inferences of the detective even more strained.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court’s deference to potential judicial
inference when the warrant-issuing judge defers to warrant
application materials210 is harmful. This deference weakens the
constitutional safeguard of particularity in that what constitutes the
requisite probable cause has been significantly broadened. Police
offers can now make generalized statements about an individual’s
signs of impairment without having to specify whether the
impairment is caused by alcohol or drugs.211 Officers’ ability to more
vaguely classify the facts of a traffic stop as evidence of general illegal
impairment unduly empowers police to more easily obtain a warrant
and cause an individual’s expectation of privacy to be intruded upon
through a blood draw and blood testing for an unknown type of
intoxicant.212 The broader the search in such fishing expeditions,
the greater the intrusion into the individual’s expectations of
medical and personal privacy.
The Minnesota Supreme Court should reverse its holding so
that Minnesota police can no longer secure warrants in DUI traffic
stops based on broad hunches that require no further specificity
than that the individual is suspected of some type of nebulous
impairment. With nothing but bare hunches, police can too easily
obtain warrants for blood draws without taking time to critically
articulate exactly why the blood draw is needed. Fawcett’s
problematic increase in the accessibility of blood draws is an
unnecessary infringement on the privacy expectations of individuals
because sensitive medical and personal information can be easily

210. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Fawcett said that it “defer[s] to the issuing
magistrate.” Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 387. However, the case also makes clear that the
warrant-issuing judge was deferring to the warrant application by the fact that the
judge incorporated the warrant application into the warrant by reference. Id. at 383.
211. Search Warrant that Permitted Search of Defendant’s Blood for Alcohol or Controlled
Substances Was Sufficiently Particular, L. OFFICER’S BULL., Sept. 25, 2015, at 9 (“A
search warrant that permitted the search of a defendant’s blood for alcohol and
other controlled substances satisfied the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.”). Knowledge of the Fawcett finding is made readily available to all
subscribing police forces by this brief synopsis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
holding in Fawcett, which was written as a guide for the benefit of police officers. See
id.
212. Perhaps a policy of police efficiency is at play. It may be that the Minnesota
Supreme Court wanted to enable police officers to more easily obtain evidence of
impairment since, after the recent Birchfield decision, officers’ jobs have become
more difficult, as they now need a warrant before they can take a blood draw. See
supra note 75.
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found in the blood.213 The constitutional safeguard of particularity
would be properly respected and the individual’s right against
unreasonable searches would be better protected through a reversal
of Fawcett.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Fawcett plays a key
role in evolving national jurisprudence on blood draw testing. First,
it reaffirms the individual’s expectation of privacy in his or her
blood. This finding rightly follows the trajectory set by the United
States Supreme Court in Skinner and more recently in Birchfield.
Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett opinion marks
the first case the court has decided on the issue of blood draws since
the United States Supreme Court’s Birchfield decision. The Fawcett
decision not only carries its own authority as precedent set for the
state, but it may also become an authoritative reference for how
courts across the nation utilize Birchfield. Since the Minnesota
Supreme Court has chosen to interpret Birchfield as a reinstatement
of reasonable expectations of privacy in an individual’s blood
sample,214 individuals’ rights will enjoy greater protection.
Magistrates’ decisions to issue warrants will be analyzed to determine
their authority to allow blood draws and to allow searches of
individuals’ blood samples. This recognition of an individual’s
expectation of privacy in his or her blood is contrary to the findings
of many other states215 and turns Minnesota itself in a new direction.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett decision has
also set problematic precedent in the area of warrant interpretation.
By upholding the importance of a warrant-issuing judge’s
independent analysis216 when the warrant-issuing judge himself
deferred to the applying detective’s judgment by incorporating the
warrant application materials into the warrant, the court has created
a bizarre result. The way in which the Fawcett decision handled

213. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (2016); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
214. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3.
215. See supra note 29.
216. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385 (quoting State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700,
704 (Minn. 1990)) (“We defer to the issuing magistrate, recognizing that ‘doubtful
or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded
to warrants.’”).
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warrant scrutiny generally217 will likely empower warrant-issuing
judges to draft broader warrants in the future without fearing that
warrants will be nullified for lack of particularity or overbreadth.
When writing their applications and affidavits for search warrants,
police will likely feel less pressure to describe all items they may
expect to find in a search. They will have the advantage of knowing
that warrants will be broadly interpreted to include a wide range of
inferences that an issuing judge might have made, even if these
inferences go well beyond the actual language of the warrants.
Minnesota would benefit if a future Minnesota Supreme Court case
re-visiting Fawcett would overturn its holding on warrant
interpretation while upholding the expectation of privacy Fawcett
acknowledges individuals have in their blood.

217. Future Minnesota cases may cite to Fawcett as a case that has expanded the
degree of deference given to warrant-issuing magistrates, noting that the court
interpreted the warrant to allow a search for alcohol and drugs even when the
application and affidavit had only mentioned that officers believed Fawcett was
under the “influence of alcohol.” Id. at 385.
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